On February 5, 1997, several years after the fall of the Soviet Union and three years after Bill Clinton coerced Ukraine into relinquishing its nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for recognition of its borders and security guarantees from America, former ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan wrote an op-ed in The New York Times titled “A Fateful Error.” In this piece, he lamented that the so-called “NATO expansion” would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” The term “NATO expansion” falsely implies an aggressive entity, when nations freely apply to join, and NATO’s rigorous process ensures only qualified states are admitted with unanimous consent.
Kennan, the architect of the Soviet “containment” policy, i.e., the policy of appeasement, argued that states joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would “inflame” Russia.
He wrote:
Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma’s ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.
Today, this argument might be referred to as “word salad”. Despite this, Kennan’s words are often used to criticize NATO and justify Russian aggression. But there would be no need for NATO if Russia could refrain from invading her neighbors.
Russia’s Real Goal: Resurrecting the Glorious Soviet Union
The blunt truth is that NATO is in the way of Russia’s open, comprehensive, but largely ignored plan to resurrect the Soviet empire. NATO does not “threaten” Russia. NATO keeps Russia at bay, and NATO is absolutely necessary as long as expansionist communist dictators like Vladimir Putin are in charge of Russia.
Russia’s ‘NATO’ and Beyond
Russia, after all, has its own “Eurasian political, economic, international security and defense bloc”, called the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Openly anti-West, the SCO was founded in 2001 by the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It grew to eight members with the addition of India and Pakistan in June 2017, followed by Iran in July 2023 and Belarus in July 2024. Americans appear to be unaware of the SCO, let alone have concerns about it’s “expansion”.
NATO’s Open Door: A Shield Against Russian Threats
The notion of “NATO expansion” as a provocative act against Russia, warned against by George Kennan, is a false premise that ignores the sovereign choices of nations.
Every country has the absolute right to join NATO or any alliance that it chooses to ensure its security, particularly against Russia’s proven aggression. No written agreement prohibits countries from seeking NATO membership, and Russia’s invasions – not the decisions of independent nations – are the sole cause of tensions like the Ukraine crisis.
Kennan’s 1997 claim that NATO’s inclusion of Eastern European nations would be a “fateful error” is wrong and dismisses the rights of sovereign states to protect themselves. His earlier containment strategy, meant to counter Soviet expansion, was itself an appeasement approach, akin to allowing murder in one state while protecting others, and mirrors the flawed isolationist or “restrainer” mindset of today’s critics who prioritize avoiding conflict with Russia over defending vulnerable nations.
‘Not One Inch Eastward’: Are Verbal Statements Binding?
Following the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, which symbolized the end of Cold War divisions, Western leaders sought Soviet approval for German unification within NATO. In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker famously assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward” beyond East Germany. Other Western officials echoed similar verbal promises to ease Soviet security concerns during these sensitive negotiations.
These assurances, however, were not legally binding because they were never formalized in the 1990 Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which only restricted NATO’s military presence in former East German territory. After the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, NATO expanded eastward, starting with Poland and others in 1999, viewing the assurances as specific to German unification, not a permanent pledge.
Kennan’s Flawed Containment and NATO Critique
George Kennan, the architect of the Cold War “containment” strategy, argued in 1946 and 1947 that the Soviet Union’s expansionist tendencies should be countered through patient, non-military means. This philosophy would certainly resonate with the “restrainer movement,” e.g., the Elbridge Colbys and Tucker Carlsons of today.
Containment was an appeasement strategy, selectively resisting Soviet influence in strategic areas while tolerating its dominance elsewhere, much like allowing a murderer to operate freely in one state but not others. This approach implicitly ceded regions like Eastern Europe to Soviet control, prioritizing stability over universal defense of sovereignty.
Kennan’s 1997 warning that allowing countries like Poland, Hungary, or Ukraine to join NATO would inflame Russian nationalism and militarism extends this appeasement logic, wrongly assuming Russia has a legitimate claim to dictate its neighbors’ alliances.
His view dismisses the sovereign right of nations to join NATO for protection against Russia’s aggression, from Georgia to Crimea, and aligns with modern isolationists or “restrainers” who advocate retreating from global commitments to avoid provoking adversaries. Kennan’s fear of Russian backlash, absent any legal restriction on NATO’s open-door policy, bolsters Russia’s narrative, excusing its expansionist ambitions.
The Reality of NATO’s Open-Door Policy
NATO, founded in part to counter Soviet aggression, exists to protect its members through collective defense under Article 5, which treats an attack on one as an attack on all. Countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states joined NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s to secure themselves against Russia’s threats, not as part of an aggressive NATO agenda. Vladimir Putin opposes NATO’s open-door policy, which allows any qualified European nation to join, viewing it as a threat to his expansionist vision.
Russia’s actions-annexing Crimea in 2014, fueling separatism in Ukraine’s east, and invading Ukraine in 2022-prove that nations seeking NATO membership are responding to real threats, not provoking them.
Russia’s Aggression, Not NATO, Drives Conflict
The Ukraine crisis is entirely the result of Russia’s belligerence, not nations choosing NATO. Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO reflects its need for defense against a neighbor that repeatedly violates its sovereignty. Russia’s ultimatums, like Putin’s 2021 demand for guarantees against NATO’s open-door policy, aim to veto independent nations’ choices, revealing his imperial ambitions. No treaty restricts NATO’s ability to admit members, and Russia’s claim to a sphere of influence is baseless. Kennan’s prediction that NATO’s inclusion of new members would provoke Russia ignores that Russia’s actions create the need for such alliances. If Russia stopped invading its neighbors, NATO’s appeal would wane, as nations would face no threat.
Kennan’s Misjudgment in Historical Context
Kennan’s containment strategy, by tolerating Soviet control over certain regions, set a precedent for his later opposition to NATO’s open-door policy. In the 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Eastern European nations sought NATO membership to secure independence and deter Russian revanchism. Kennan’s suggestion that alternatives like the European Union could replace NATO’s security guarantees ignored the EU’s lack of military power and Russia’s immediate threat. His fear of provoking Russia, reminiscent of today’s isolationists or “restrainers” who prioritize avoiding conflict over defending allies, underestimated the resolve of democratic nations to choose their paths. President Bill Clinton’s support for countries joining NATO, driven by U.S. strategic interests and electoral appeals to Eastern European-American communities, rightly prioritized their security. Russia’s aggression, from Chechnya to Ukraine, validates NATO’s role and exposes Kennan’s appeasement as shortsighted.
The Enduring Necessity of NATO
NATO’s inclusion of new members has strengthened global security. Its interventions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Libya show its adaptability to threats like genocide and terrorism. The Baltic states, once vulnerable, are now more secure under NATO’s protection, proving membership’s value. Ukraine’s struggle underscores the consequences of lacking NATO’s shield, not the dangers of seeking it.
Kennan’s warning, echoed by modern “restrainers” who fear provoking Russia, fails to account for Russia’s aggression and the sovereign right of nations to defend themselves.
Conclusion: Debunking Kennan’s Legacy
George Kennan’s containment strategy, an appeasement approach akin to allowing murder in one state but not others, and his 1997 warning against countries joining NATO are flawed critiques that prioritize Russia’s future plans of conquest over the sovereign rights of nations. The idea of “NATO expansion” as a driver of conflict is false; Russia’s aggression causes crises like Ukraine’s. Nations have every right to join NATO, and no agreement restricts this freedom. Kennan’s fear of Russian backlash, mirroring today’s isolationist “restrainers,” excuses Putin’s expansionist ambitions and undermines nations’ agency. NATO’s open-door policy is a lifeline for nations under threat. Russia’s invasions, not NATO’s existence, fuel instability, and Kennan’s caution is decisively debunked by the reality of sovereign choices and Russia’s unrelenting aggression.
